The major rules reforms of and were generated by specially-appointed panels. Following the revolt against Speaker Cannon came the practice of reporting House rules changes at the beginning of a Congress from the majority party caucus instead of waiting for the Rules Committee to act. This practice continued in the late twentieth century. Moreover, further rules reforms of any magnitude often are initiated by special entities outside the Rules Committee.
For example, the and Legislative Reorganization Acts originated from joint House-Senate committees; the Budget Act from a joint committee on the budget; and the House Committee Reform Amendments of from a bipartisan select committee.
But in most such reform efforts, not only were the Rules Committee members represented on the special panels, but the committee itself retained final review authority and the right to recommend substantive changes. These subcommittees are charged with reviewing the budget process and the procedures of the House. In sum, the great paradox of the Rules Committee is that while it originally was created to develop a set of standing rules and uniform order of business for the House, its principal role now is to devise special rules to manage floor debate on legislation outside of those standing rule.
This development, over a two-century period, reflects the growing complexity of the Congress and the issues it confronts, the changing relationships among its internal components, and the ultimate need for a mechanism to assist the leadership in coordinating and processing the business of the Congress in an orderly and expeditious fashion.
As an arm of the leadership, regardless of which party controls the House, the Committee is at the center of both political and legislative battles, performing precarious balancing acts between majority will and minority rights, leadership needs and membership demands, and a wide range of public policy options. The flexibility of the Committee over the years to adapt to changing circumstances and help bring order out of uncertainty is the best measure of its continuing utility and necessity.
Bolling, Richard. Power in the House. History of the United States House of Representatives. Edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. House of Representatives. Committee on Rules. A History of the Committee on Rules. Committee Print. Donald R. Bacon, Roger H. Davidson, and Morton Keller.
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Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search. Abstract This essay investigates the relationship between congressional committees, information, and gatekeeping power. References Austen-Smith, D. Google Scholar Austen-Smith, D. Google Scholar Baron, D. Google Scholar Berman, D. Google Scholar Cooper, J. Google Scholar Cox, G. Google Scholar Crawford, V. Google Scholar Froman, L.
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Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: It shows that the power to obstruct legislation increases the amount of information transmitted by committees in equilibrium. As a consequence, rational floor actors will make it somewhat difficult, but not impossible, to discharge committees.
Some committees will have effective gatekeeping power under the optimal rule, while others will not. The only committees that will be discharged… Expand. View on Springer. Save to Library Save. Create Alert Alert. Share This Paper. Figures from this paper. Citation Type. Has PDF. Publication Type. More Filters. The discharge petition process offers a simple majority of members of the U. House of Representatives a mechanism to circumvent gatekeeping imposed by committees and party leaders.
Using recently … Expand. Foundations of Legislative Organization and Committee Influence.
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